Blog 33: 5/11/23: Historical Aviation episode: The Battle of the Coral Sea, May 4-8, 1942
USS Lexington Under Fire
Welcome back to Brooke In The Air! Today is another fantastic historical deep dive in military aviation. When the Pacific War comes to mind, many think of Saipan, Guadalcanal, Okinawa, or if their more familiar, Tarawa or Iwo Jima, these are important battles to be sure, but they are ground engagements. people might recall the Battle of Midway+ the climactic turning point in the Pacific War. But often they don't recall the prelude to that major Turning Point - the battle that occurred just three weeks prior. It might not seem related, but the battle of the Coral Sea was the first naval battle decided entirely by military aircraft. Taking place in the Pacific Theatre of World War II, the battle was the first naval action in which the opposing fleets neither sighted nor fired upon one another, attacking over the horizon from aircraft carriers instead. Indeed, the entire conflict was explicitly fought BVR, or Beyond Visual Range. We'll examine the battle section by section.
CAUSE
Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King
Commander-in-Chief, US Navy
To strengthen their defensive position in the South Pacific, the Japanese decided to invade and occupy Port Moresby (in New Guinea) and Tulagi (in the southeastern Solomon Islands). The plan, Operation Mo, involved several major units of Japan's Combined Fleet. Two fleet carriers and a light carrier were assigned to provide air cover for the invasion forces, under the overall command of Admiral Shigeyoshi Inoue.
Fleet Admiral William F. “Bull” Halsey, career photo.
1945, before he retired.
Admiral Frank J. Fletcher
US Naval Archives, Annapolis, Maryland
The U.S. learned of the Japanese plan through signals intelligence (early use of SIGINT) and sent two U.S. Navy carrier task forces and a joint Australian-American cruiser force to oppose the offensive, under the overall command of U.S. Admiral Frank J. Fletcher (pictured below) appointed by then-Rear Admiral William F. “Bull” Halsey (pictured left, colorized).
On 3rd–4th of May, Japanese forces invaded and occupied Tulagi, although several supporting warships were sunk or damaged in a surprise attack by the U.S. carrier USS Yorktown. Alerted to the presence of enemy aircraft carriers, the Japanese fleet carriers advanced towards the Coral Sea to locate and destroy the Allied naval forces. On the evening of 6 May, the two carrier fleets closed to within 70 nmi (130 km) but did not detect each other in the darkness. The next day, both fleets launched airstrikes against what they thought was the enemy fleet carriers, but both sides actually attacked other targets. The U.S. sank the Japanese light carrier Shōhō, and the Japanese sank a U.S. destroyer and damaged the fleet oiler Neosho.
On the 8th of May, both sides finally located and attacked the other's fleet carriers, leaving the Japanese fleet carrier Shōkaku, a member of the original Kido Butai, damaged, the U.S. fleet carrier USS Lexington critically damaged and later scuttled, and the fleet carrier USS Yorktown moderately damaged.
Both sides having suffered heavy aircraft losses and carriers sunk or damaged, the two forces disengaged and retired from the area. Because of the loss of carrier air cover, Inoue also recalled the Port Moresby invasion fleet. Although the battle was a tactical victory for the Japanese in terms of ships sunk, it has been described as a strategic victory for the Allies.
The battle of the Coral Sea marked the first time since the start of the war that a major Japanese advance had been turned back. More importantly, the structural damage to the Akagi-type fleet carrier IJN Shōkaku and Zuikaku.
In addition, the severe and almost-irreplaceable aircraft losses of the IJN Zuikaku's air wing helped to prevent both ships from participating in the Battle of Midway the following month in June of 1942.
BACKGROUND & PLANNING
On 8 December 1941 (7 December U.S. time), Japan declared war on the U.S. and the British Empire, after Japanese forces attacked Malaya, Singapore, Hong Kong, as well as the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor. In launching this war, Japanese leaders sought to neutralize the U.S. fleet, seize territory rich in natural resources, and obtain strategic military bases to defend their far-flung empire. In the words of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) Combined Fleet's "Secret Order Number One", dated 1 November 1941, the goals of the initial Japanese campaigns in the impending war were to "eject British and American strength from the Netherlands, and the Philippines, and to establish a policy of autonomous self-sufficiency and economic independence."
Overall commander of American forces in the Pacific, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz during his time as
Chief of Naval Operations, CNO, of the United States Navy (USN)
To support these goals, during the first few months of 1942, besides Malaya, Japanese forces attacked, invaded, and took control of the Philippines, Singapore, the Dutch East Indies, Wake Island, New Britain, the Gilbert Islands, Guam inflicting heavy losses on opposing Allied land, naval and air forces and expanding their so-called East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. Japan planned to use these conquered territories to establish a perimeter defense for its empire from which it expected to employ attritional tactics to defeat or exhaust any Allied counterattacks. However, Japan was not equipped to fight such a war though the leadership would never admit it.
FURTHER DEVELOPMENT
Vice-Admiral Shigeyoshi Inoue, commander of the IJN's Fourth Fleet
Biographical Photo
Shortly after the war began, Japan's Naval General Staff, or NGS, recommended an invasion of Northern Australia to prevent Australia from being used as a base to threaten Japan's perimeter defences in the South Pacific. The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) rejected the recommendation, stating that it did not have the forces or shipping capacity available to conduct such an operation.
At the same time, Vice-Admiral Shigeyoshi Inoue (pictured left), commander of the IJN's Fourth Fleet (commonly called the South Seas Force) which consisted of most of the naval units in the South Pacific area, advocated the occupation of Tulagi in the southeastern Solomon Islands and Port Moresby in New Guinea, which would put Northern Australia within range of Japanese land-based aircraft, which the Army had authority over.
Vice-Admiral Inoue believed the capture and control of these key locations would provide greater security and defensive depth for the major Japanese base at Rabaul on New Britain. The navy's general staff and the IJA accepted Admiral Inoue's proposal to occupy Tulagi in the Solomon Islands and Port Moresby. Whst was more, the NGS and IJA promoted further operations, using these locations as supporting bases, and to drive a wedge between the United States and Australia, by seizing New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa and thereby cut the supply and communication lines between Australia and the United States.
In April 1942, the army and navy developed a plan that was titled Operation Mo. The plan called for Port Moresby to be invaded from the sea and secured by 10 May. The plan also included the seizure of Tulagi on 2–3 May, where the navy would establish a seaplane base for potential air operations against Allied territories and forces in the South Pacific and to provide a base for reconnaissance aircraft. Upon the completion of Mo, the navy planned to initiate what they called Operation RY, using ships released from Mo, to seize Nauru and Ocean Island for their phosphate deposits on 15 May, steadily moving north and west towards major American territory. Further operations against Fiji, Samoa and New Caledonia (called Operation FS) were to be planned once Mo and RY were completed. Because of a damaging air attack by Allied land- and carrier-based aircraft on Japanese naval forces invading the Lae-Salamaua area in New Guinea in March, Admiral Inoue requested Japan's Combined Fleet send carriers to provide air cover for Mo. Inoue was especially worried about Allied land-based bombers stationed at air bases in Townsville and Cooktown, Australia, beyond the range of his own bombers, based at Rabaul and Lae.
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander-in-chief of the Imperial Combined Fleet, was concurrently planning an operation for June that he hoped would lure the U.S. Navy's carriers, none of which had been damaged in the Pearl Harbor attack, into a decisive showdown in the central Pacific near Midway Atoll. In the meantime Yamamoto detached some of his large warships, including two fleet carriers, a light carrier, a cruiser division, and two destroyer divisions, to support Operation Mo, and placed Vice-Admiral Inoue in charge of the naval portion of the operation.
CODES CRACKED
Isoroku Yamamoto, commander-in-chief of the combined fleet and navy minister
Unknown to the Japanese, the U.S. Navy, led by the Communication Security Section of the Office of Naval Communications, had for several years enjoyed increasing success with penetrating Japanese communication ciphers and codes. By March 1942, the U.S. was able to decipher up to 15% of the IJN's Naval Codebook D code (called "JN-25B" by the U.S.), which was used by the IJN for about half of its communications. By the end of April, the U.S. was reading up to 85% of the signals broadcast in the “Ro” or JN-25B code.
Carrier Zuikaku
1941 before sortie with the Fifth Carrier Division
March 1942, the U.S. first noticed mention of the MO operation in intercepted messages. On 5 April, the U.S. intercepted an IJN message directing a carrier and other large warships to proceed to Inoue's area of operations. On 13 April, the British deciphered an IJN message informing Admiral Inoue that the Fifth Carrier Division, consisting of the fleet carriers Shōkaku and Zuikaku, was en route to his command from Formosa via the main IJN naval base at Truk. The British passed the message to the U.S., along with their conclusion that Port Moresby was the likely target of MO.
Carrier Shōkaku in 1941
Shakedown cruise complete
AMERICAN COUNTER-PLANNING
Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, the new commander of U.S. forces in the Central Pacific, and his staff discussed the deciphered messages and agreed that the Japanese were likely initiating a major operation in the Southwest Pacific in early May with Port Moresby as the probable target. The Allies regarded Port Moresby as a key base for a planned counteroffensive, under General Douglas MacArthur, against Japanese forces in the South West Pacific area. Nimitz's staff also concluded that the Japanese operation might include carrier raids on Allied bases in Samoa and at Suva. Nimitz, after consultation with Admiral Ernest King, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet, decided to contest the Japanese operation by sending all four of the Pacific Fleet's available aircraft carriers to the Coral Sea. By 27 April, further signals intelligence (SIGINT) confirmed most of the details and targets of the MO and RY plans.
On 29 April, Nimitz issued orders that sent his four carriers and their supporting warships towards the Coral Sea. Task Force 17 (TF 17), commanded by Rear Admiral Fletcher and consisting of the carrier USS Yorktown, escorted by three cruisers and four destroyers and supported by a replenishment group of two oilers and two destroyers, was already in the South Pacific, having departed Tongatabu on 27 April en route to the Coral Sea. TF 11, commanded by Rear Admiral Aubrey Fitch and consisting of the carrier Lexington with two cruisers and five destroyers, was between Fiji and New Caledonia. TF 16, commanded by Vice Admiral William F. Halsey and including the carriers Enterprise and Hornet, had just returned to Pearl Harbor from the Doolittle Raid in the central Pacific. TF 16 immediately departed but would not reach the South Pacific in time to participate in the battle. Nimitz placed Fletcher in command of Allied naval forces in the South Pacific area until Halsey arrived with TF 16. Although the Coral Sea area was under General MacArthur's command, Fletcher and Halsey were directed to continue to report to Nimitz while in the Coral Sea area, not to MacArthur.
Based on un-encrypted non-classified intercepted radio traffic from TF 16 as it returned to Pearl Harbor, the Japanese assumed that all but one of the U.S. Navy's carriers were in the central Pacific. The Japanese did not know the location of the remaining carrier, but did not expect a U.S. carrier response to MO until the operation was well-under way.
PRELUDE TO BATTLE
During late April, the Japanese submarines designated Ro-33 and Ro-34 reconned the area where IJA landings were planned. The submarines investigated Rossel Island and the anchorage in the Louisiade Archipelago, Jomard Channel, and the route to Port Moresby from the east. Essentially, the submarines did not sight any Allied ships in the area and returned to Rabaul on 23 and 24 April respectively per each submarine.
THE INVASION FORCE & DEFENDERS
The Japanese Port Moresby Invasion Force, commanded by Rear Admiral Kōsō Abe, included 11 transport ships carrying about 5,000 soldiers from the IJA's South Seas Detachment plus about 500 troops from the 3rd Kure Special Naval Landing Force (SNLF). Escorting the transports was the Port Moresby Attack Force with one light cruiser and six relatively old Kamikaze and Mutsuki-class destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral Sadamichi Kajioka. Abe's ships departed Rabaul for the 840 nmi (970 mi; 1,560 km) trip to Port Moresby on 4 May and were joined by Kajioka's force the next day. The ships, proceeding at 8 knots (or 9.2 mph; 15 km/h), planned to transit the Jomard Channel to pass around the southern tip of New Guinea and arrive at Port Moresby by the 10th of May at the latest.
The Allied garrison at Port Moresby, by contrast, numbered around 5,333 men, but only half of these were actual infantry and all were badly equipped and undertrained, giving a false impression of American skill to the Japanese.
Leading the invasion of Tulagi was the artfully named Tulagi Invasion Force, commanded by Rear Admiral Kiyohide Shima, consisting of two minelayers, two older Mutsuki-class destroyers, five minesweepers, two subchasers (exactly what they sounded like, submarine chasers, or hunters) and a transport ship carrying about 400 troops from the 3rd Kure SNLF of the Imperial Army. Supporting the Tulagi force was the Covering Group with the light carrier Shōhō, the IJN's four Furutaka /Aoba-class heavy cruisers, and one destroyer, commanded by Rear Admiral Aritomo Gotō. This was the only impressive naval force in the operation aside from the carrier strike force.
A separate Cover Force (sometimes referred to as the Support Group but it was a Screening Force more than anything else), commanded by Rear Admiral Kuninori Marumo and consisting of two light cruisers, the seaplane tender Kamikawa Maru and three gunboats, joined the primary Covering Group in providing distant protection for the Tulagi invasion.
Map of the Battle
Once Tulagi was secured on 3rd or 4th of May, the Covering Group and Cover Force were to reposition to help screen the Port Moresby invasion. Admiral Inoue directed the MO operation from the cruiser Kashima, with which he arrived at Rabaul from Truk on the 4th of May.
The Carrier Strike Force, with the carriers Zuikaku and Shōkaku, two heavy cruisers, and six destroyers, sortied from Truk on 1 May. The strike force was commanded by Vice Admiral Takeo Takagi (flag on cruiser Myōkō, which meant he commanded the force from that cruiser), with Rear Admiral Chūichi Hara, on IJN Zuikaku, in tactical command of the carrier air forces. The Carrier Strike Force was to proceed down the eastern side of the Solomon Islands and enter the Coral Sea south of Guadalcanal. Once in the Coral Sea, the carriers were to provide air cover for the invasion forces, eliminate Allied air power at Port Moresby, as well as intercept and destroy any Allied naval forces which entered the Coral Sea in response. A sound strategy in theory.
THE CHESS BOARD IS SET
USS Lexington “Lady Lex” CV-2 in 1941, leaving San Diego, California and San Diego Harbor heading into the Pacific
To give advance warning of the approach of any Allied naval forces, the Japanese sent submarines designated I-22, I-24, I-28 and I-29 to form a scouting line in the ocean about 450 nmi (830 km) southwest of Guadalcanal. Admiral Fletcher's forces had entered the Coral Sea area before the submarines took station, and the Japanese were therefore unaware of their presence. Another submarine, I-21, which was sent to scout around Nouméa, was attacked by Yorktown aircraft on the 2nd of May. The submarine took no damage and apparently did not realize that it had been attacked by carrier aircraft. Ro-33 and Ro-34, the submarines from earlier, were also deployed in an attempt to blockade Port Moresby, arriving off the town on 5th of May. Neither submarine engaged any ships during the battle.
On the morning of the 1st of May, Task Force TF 17 and Task Force (TF) 11 united about 300 nmi (560 km) northwest of New Caledonia. Fletcher immediately detached TF 11 to refuel from the oiler Tippecanoe, while TF 17 refueled from Neosho. TF 17 completed refueling the next day, but TF 11 reported that they would not be finished fueling until 4 May. Fletcher elected to take TF 17 northwest towards the Louisiades and ordered TF 11 to meet TF 44, which was en route from Sydney and Nouméa, on 4 May once refueling was complete. TF 44 was a joint Australia–U.S. warship force under MacArthur's command, led by Australian Rear Admiral John Crace and made up of the cruisers HMAS Australia, HMAS Hobart, and USS Chicago, along with three destroyers. Once it completed refueling TF 11, Tippecanoe departed the Coral Sea to deliver its remaining fuel to Allied ships.
Early on the 3rd of May, Admiral Shima's main invasion force arrived off Tulagi and began disembarking the naval troops to occupy the island. Tulagi was undefended: the small garrison of Australian commandos and a Royal Australian Air Force reconnaissance unit evacuated just before Shima's arrival. The Japanese forces immediately began construction of a seaplane and communications base. Aircraft from the light carrier Shōhō covered the landings until early afternoon, when Admiral Gotō's covering force turned towards Bougainville to refuel in preparation to support the landings at Port Moresby.
At 17:00 on 3 May, Fletcher was notified that the Japanese Tulagi invasion force had been sighted the day before, approaching the southern Solomons. Unknown to Fletcher, TF 11 completed refueling that morning ahead of schedule and was only 60 nmi (110 km) east of TF 17, but was unable to communicate its status because of Fletcher's orders to maintain radio silence. TF 17 changed course and proceeded at 27 kn (31 mph; 50 km/h) towards Guadalcanal to launch airstrikes against the Japanese forces at Tulagi the next morning.
On 4 May, from a position 100 nmi (190 km) south of Guadalcanal, a total of 60 aircraft from TF 17 launched three consecutive strikes against Shima's forces off Tulagi. USS Yorktown's aircraft surprised Shima's ships and sank the destroyer Kikuzuki and three of the minesweepers, damaged four other ships, and destroyed four seaplanes which were supporting the landings. The U.S. lost one torpedo bomber and two fighters in the strikes, but all of the aircrew were eventually rescued. After recovering its aircraft late in the evening of 4 May, TF 17 retired towards the south. In spite of the damage suffered in the carrier strikes, the Japanese continued construction of the seaplane base and began flying reconnaissance missions from Tulagi by 6 May. The Americans had drawn first blood in the naval battle.
RECON & CRITICAL DECISIONS
At 08:16 on 5 May, TF 17 rendezvoused with TF 11 and TF 44 at a predetermined point 320 nmi (590 km) south of Guadalcanal. At about the same time, four Grumman F4F Wildcat fighters from Yorktown intercepted a Kawanishi H6K reconnaissance seaplane from the Yokohama Air Group of the 25th Air Flotilla based at the occupied Shortland Islands, a province of the Solomons to the west, and shot it down 11 nmi (20 km) from TF 11. The aircraft failed to send a report before it crashed, but when it didn't return to base the Japanese correctly assumed that it had been shot down by carrier aircraft.
A message from Pearl Harbor notified Fletcher that radio intelligence deduced the Japanese planned to land their troops at Port Moresby on the 10th of May and their fleet carriers would likely be operating close to the invasion convoy. Armed with this information, Fletcher directed Task Force 17 to refuel from the oiler Neosho. After the refueling was completed on the 6th of May, he planned to take his forces north towards and do battle on the 7th of May.
In the meantime, Takagi's carrier force steamed down the east side of the Solomons throughout the day on 5 May, turned west to pass south of San Cristobal (an island now locally known as Makira), and entered the Coral Sea after transiting between Guadalcanal and Rennell Island, another province of the Solomons, in the early morning hours of 6 May. Takagi commenced refueling his ships 180 nmi (330 km) west of Tulagi in preparation for the carrier battle he expected would take place the next day.
On the 6th of May, Fletcher absorbed TF 11 and TF 44 into TF 17, forming a large battlegroup. Believing the Japanese carriers were still well to the north near Bougainville, Fletcher continued to refuel. Reconnaissance patrols conducted from the U.S. carriers throughout the day failed to locate any of the Japanese naval forces, because they were located just beyond scouting range.
BATTLE BEGINS
At 10:00, a Kawanishi reconnaissance seaplane from Tulagi sighted Fletcher’s TF 17 and notified its headquarters. Admiral Takagi received the report at 10:50 AM. At that time, Takagi's force was about 300 nmi (350 mi; 560 km) north of Fletcher, near the maximum range for his carrier aircraft. Takagi, whose ships were still refueling, was not yet ready to engage in battle. He concluded, based on the sighting report, TF 17 was heading south and increasing the range. Furthermore, Fletcher's ships were under a large, low-hanging overcast which Takagi and Hara felt would make it difficult for their aircraft to find the U.S. carriers. Takagi detached his two carriers with two destroyers under Hara's command to head towards TF 17 at 20 kn (37 km/h) in order to be in position to attack at first light (dawn) the next day while the rest of his ships completed refueling and would catch up.
U.S. B-17 Flying Fortress bombers under General MacArthur's command, based in Australia and staging through Port Moresby, attacked the approaching Port Moresby invasion forces, including Admiral Gotō's heavy cruisers, several times during the day on the 6th of May without success. MacArthur's headquarters radioed Fletcher with reports of the attacks and the locations of the Japanese invasion forces. MacArthur's fliers' reports of seeing a carrier (the Shōhō) about 425 nmi (787 km) northwest of TF 17 further convinced Admiral Fletcher that the IJN fleet carriers were accompanying the invasion force.
At 18:00, TF 17 completed fueling and Fletcher detached Neosho with a destroyer, Sims, to take station further south at a prearranged rendezvou TF 17 then turned to head northwest towards Rossel Island in the Louisiades, at the northern tip of New Guinea.
Unbeknownst to the two adversaries, their carriers were only 70 nmi (130 km) away from each other by 20:00 that night. At 20:00, Admiral Hara reversed course to meet Admiral Takagi who completed refueling and was now heading in Hara's direction to meet up.
CARRIER BATTLE - 1
USS Yorktown during Repairs
Stationed at Pearl Harbor before sortie to Coral Sea
At 06:25 on 7 May, TF 17 was 115 nmi (213 km) south of Rossel Island. At this time, Admiral Fletcher sent Admiral Crace's cruiser force, now designated Task Group 17.3 (TG 17.3), to block the Jomard Passage. Fletcher understood that Crace would be operating without air cover since TF 17's carriers would be busy trying to locate and attack the Japanese carriers. Detaching Australian Admiral Sir John Crace reduced the anti-aircraft defenses for Fletcher's carriers. Nevertheless, Fletcher decided the risk was necessary to ensure the Japanese invasion forces could not slip through to Port Moresby while he engaged the carriers.
Believing Takagi's carrier force was somewhere north of him, in the vicinity of the Louisiades, beginning at 06:19, Fletcher directed Yorktown to send 10 Douglas SBD Dauntless dive bombers as scouts to search that area. Hara in turn believed Fletcher was south of him and advised Takagi to send the aircraft to search that area. Takagi, about 300 nmi (560 km) east of Fletcher, launched 12 Nakajima B5Ns at 06:00 to scout for TF 17. Around the same time, Gotō's cruisers Kinugasa and Furutaka launched four Kawanishi E7K2 Type 94 seaplanes to search southeast of the Louisiades off New Guinea. Augmenting their search were several seaplanes from the nearby island of Deboyne, four Kawanishi H6Ks from Tulagi, and three Mitsubishi G4M bombers from Rabaul. Essentially, carrier planes launched from land bases. Each side readied the rest of its carrier attack aircraft to launch immediately once the enemy was located.
At 07:22 one of Takagi's carrier scouts, from Shōkaku, reported U.S. ships bearing 182° (just west of due-south), 163 nmi (302 km) from Takagi. At 07:45, the scout confirmed that it had located "one carrier, one cruiser, and three destroyers". Another Shōkaku scout aircraft quickly confirmed the sighting. The Shōkaku aircraft actually sighted and misidentified the oiler Neosho and it's escort, the destroyer Sims, which had earlier been detailed away from the fleet to a southern rendezvous point.
Believing that he had located the U.S. carrier force, Hara, with Takagi's concurrence, immediately launched all of his available aircraft. A total of 78 aircraft—18 Zero fighters, 36 Aichi D3A dive bombers, and 24 torpedo aircraft—began launching from Shōkaku and Zuikaku at 08:00 and were on their way by 08:15 towards the reported sighting. The strike force was under overall command of Lieutenant Commander Kakuichi Takahashi, while Lieutenant Commander Shigekazu Shimazaki led its torpedo bombers. Positions of great honor for these 20tg century samurai indeed.
At 08:15, a USS Yorktown SBD scout bomber piloted by Lieutenant John L. Nielsen sighted Gotō's force, screening the invasion convoy. Nielsen, making an error in his coded message, reported the sighting as "two carriers and four heavy cruisers" 225 nmi (417 km) northwest of TF17. Fletcher concluded that the Japanese main carrier force was located and ordered the launch of all available carrier aircraft to attack. By 10:13, the U.S. strike of 93 aircraft—18 Grumman F4F Wildcats, 53 Douglas SBD Dauntless dive bombers, and 22 Douglas TBD Devastator torpedo bombers—was on its way. At 10:19, Nielsen landed and discovered his coding error. Although Gotō's force included the light carrier Shōhō with his heavy cruisers, Nielsen thought that he saw a combination of two cruisers and four destroyers and thus the main fleet. At 10:12, Fletcher received a report of an aircraft carrier, ten transports, and 16 warships 30 nmi (35 mi; 56 km) south of Nielsen's sighting at 10°35′S latitude, 152°36′E longitude. The B-17 heavy bombers actually saw the same thing as Lieutenant Nielsen: Shōhō, Gotō's cruisers, plus the Port Moresby Invasion Force. Believing that the B-17's sighting was the main Japanese carrier force (which was in fact, well to the east), Admiral Fletcher directed the airborne strike force towards this target. Hindsight is perfect, unfortunately.
At 09:15, Takahashi's strike force reached its target area, sighted the oiler Neosho and it's combat escort, USS Sims, and searched in vain for the U.S. carriers for a couple of hours. Finally, at 10:51 Shōkaku scout aircrews realized they were mistaken in their identification of the oiler and destroyer as aircraft carriers. Takagi now realized the U.S. carriers were between him and the invasion convoy, placing the invasion forces in extreme danger.
At 11:15, the torpedo bombers and fighters abandoned the mission and headed back towards the carriers with their ordnance, while the 36 dive bombers attacked the two U.S. ships. The oiler Neosho was burning in minutes.
Four dive bombers attacked Sims and the rest dived on Neosho. The destroyer was hit by three bombs, broke in half, and sank immediately, killing all but 14 of her 192-man crew. Neosho was hit by seven bombs. One of the dive bombers, hit by anti-aircraft fire, crashed into the oiler. Heavily damaged and without power, Neosho was left drifting and slowly sinking. Before losing power, Neosho was able to notify Fletcher by radio that she was under attack and in trouble, but garbled any further details as to just who or what was attacking her and gave the wrong coordinates for her position.
Light Carrier Shōhō in her prime in 1940
Tokyo Archives
Light Carrier Shōhō on fire and sinking
Source: US Naval Archives.
The U.S. strike aircraft sighted the carrier Shōhō a short distance northeast of Misima Island at 10:40 and deployed to attack. The Japanese carrier was protected by four Zeros and two Mitsubishi A5M fighters, less advanced predecessors to the Zero, flying combat air patrol (CAP), as the rest of the carrier's aircraft were being prepared below decks for a strike against the U.S. carriers. Admiral Gotō's cruisers surrounded the carrier in a diamond formation, 3,000–5,000 yd (2,700–4,600 m) off each of Shōhō's corners.
Shōhō When First Under American Attack
Source: USS Yorktown Dive Bomber SBD
Attacking first, Lexington's air group, led by Commander William B. Ault hit Shōhō with two 1,000 lb (450 kg) bombs and five torpedoes, causing severe damage. At 11:00, Yorktown's air group attacked the burning and now almost stationary and listing carrier, scoring with up to 11 more 1,000 lb (450 kg) bombs and at least two torpedoes. Being torn apart, Shōhō sank at 11:35 AM. Fearing more air attacks, Admiral Gotō withdrew his remaining warships to the north, but sent the destroyer Sazanami back at 14:00 to rescue survivors. Only 203 of the carrier's 834-man crew were recovered. Three U.S. aircraft were lost in the attack: two SBDs from Lexington and one from Yorktown.
All of Shōhō's aircraft complement of 18 fighters and bombers was lost, but three of the Combat Air Patrol fighter pilots were able to ditch at Deboyne and survived. At 12:10, using a prearranged message to signal TF 17 on the success of the mission, Lexington SBD dive bomber pilot and squadron commander Robert Dixon radioed "Scratch one flat top! Signed Bob."
Later that day, Enemy Sighted…(Carrier Battle 2 - postponed, day 1)
The U.S. aircraft returned and landed on their carriers by 13:38. By 14:20, the aircraft were rearmed and ready to launch against the Port Moresby Invasion Force or Gotō's cruisers, whichever they found first. Fletcher was concerned that the locations of the rest of the Japanese fleet carriers were still unknown. He was informed that Allied intelligence sources believed that up to four Japanese carriers might be supporting the MO operation. Fletcher concluded that by the time his scout aircraft found the remaining carriers it would be too late in the day to mount a strike. Thus, Fletcher decided to hold off on another strike this day and remain concealed under the thick overcast with fighters ready in defense. Fletcher turned TF 17 southwest, into the wind.
Zuikaku’s aircraft undergoing final checks by aircrews prior to takeoff
Battle of the Coral Sea, 1942
Apprised of the loss of Shōhō, Inoue ordered the invasion convoy to temporarily withdraw to the north and ordered Takagi, at this time located 225 nmi (259 mi; 417 km) east of TF 17, to destroy the U.S. carrier forces. As the invasion convoy reversed course, it was bombed by eight U.S. Army B-17s, but was, yet again, not damaged. Gotō and Kajioka were told to assemble their remaining ships south of Rossel Island, at the tip of New Guinea, for a night surface battle if the U.S. ships came within range, believing night would favor them.
At 12:40 PM, a Deboyne-based seaplane sighted and reported Admiral Crace's detached Australian cruiser and destroyer force on a bearing of 175°, 78 nmi (144 km) from Deboyne. At 13:15, an aircraft from Rabaul sighted Crace's force but submitted an erroneous report, stating the force contained two carriers and was located, bearing 205°, 115 nmi (213 km) from the Deboyne Island Chain.
Based on these reports, Takagi, who was still awaiting the return of all of his aircraft from attacking Neosho, turned his carriers due west at 13:30 (1:30 pm) and advised Admiral Inoue at 15:00 (3 pm) that the U.S. carriers were at least 430 nmi (800 km) west of his location and that he would therefore be unable to attack them that day.
USS Lexington (center-right) Burning and Under Heavy Enemy (IJN) Attack
Battle Day 2
Admiral Inoue's staff directed two groups of attack aircraft from Rabaul, already airborne since that morning, towards Crace's reported position. The first group included 12 torpedo-armed G4M bombers and the second group comprised 19 Mitsubishi G3M land attack aircraft armed with bombs. Both groups found and attacked Crace's ships at 14:30 and claimed to have sunk a "California-type" battleship and damaged another battleship and cruiser. In reality, Crace's ships were undamaged and shot down four G4Ms. A short time later, three U.S. Army B-17s mistakenly bombed Crace, but caused no damage. It was an embarrassing moment for both sides, the Americans for accidentally bombing their Allies and the Japanese for misidentifying and finding the wrong target.
Crace at 15:26 radioed Fletcher he could not complete his mission without air support. Crace retired southward to a position about 220 nmi (250 mi; 410 km) southeast of Port Moresby to increase the range from Japanese carrier- or land-based aircraft while remaining close enough to intercept any Japanese naval forces advancing beyond the Louisiades through either the Jomard Passage or the China Strait. Crace's ships were low on fuel, and as Fletcher was maintaining radio silence (and had not informed him in advance), Crace had no idea of Fletcher's location, status, or intentions.
The Final Death Throes of the US fleet carrier USS Lexington, likely caused by torpedo attack, May 8, 1942.
Shortly after 15:00, carrier Zuikaku monitored a message from a Deboyne-based reconnaissance aircraft reporting (incorrectly) Crace's force altered course to 120° true (southeast). Takagi's staff assumed the aircraft was shadowing Fletcher's carriers and determined if the Allied ships held that course, they would be within striking range shortly before nightfall. Admirals Takagi and Hara were determined to attack immediately with a select group of aircraft, minus fighter escort, even though it meant the strike would return after dark.
To try to confirm the location of the U.S. carriers, at 15:15 Hara sent a flight of eight torpedo bombers as scouts to sweep 200 nmi (370 km) westward. About that same time, the dive bombers that had attacked Neosho returned and landed. Six of the weary dive bomber pilots were told they would be immediately departing on another mission. Choosing his most experienced crews, including Takahashi, Shimazaki and Lieutenant Tamotsu Ema, at 16:15 Hara launched 12 dive bombers and 15 torpedo planes with orders to fly on a heading of 277° to 280 nmi (520 km). The eight scout aircraft reached the end of their 200 nmi (370 km) search leg and turned back without seeing Fletcher's ships. This led to more frustration for the Japanese.
At 17:47, TF 17 – operating under thick overcast 200 nmi (370 km) west of Takagi – detected the Japanese strike on radar heading in their direction, turned southeast into the wind, and vectored 11 Combst Air Patrol (CAP) Wildcats, led by Lieutenant Commanders Paul H. Ramsey and James H. Flatley, to intercept. Taking the Japanese formation by surprise, the Wildcats shot down seven torpedo bombers and one dive bomber, and heavily damaged another torpedo bomber (which later crashed), at a cost of three F4F Wildcats lost. These losses embarrassed and infuriated Admiral Hara.
Having taken heavy losses in the attack, which also scattered their formations, the Japanese strike leaders canceled the mission after conferring by radio. The remaining Japanese aircraft all jettisoned their ordnance into the sea and reversed course to return to their carriers. The sun set at 18:30. Several of the Japanese dive bombers encountered the U.S. carriers, Lexington and Yorktown, in the darkness, around 19:00, and briefly confused as to their identity, circled in preparation for landing before anti-aircraft fire from TF 17's destroyers drove them away. By 20:00 (8 PM) Allied TF 17 and Admiral Takagi were about 100 nmi (190 km) apart. Takagi turned on his warships' searchlights to help guide the 18 combined surviving aircraft back and all were recovered by 22:00 (10 PM).
In the meantime, at 15:18 and 17:18 the poor little oiler Neosho was able to radio TF 17 she was drifting northwest in a sinking condition. Neosho's 17:18 report gave wrong coordinates, which hampered subsequent U.S. rescue efforts to locate the oiler. More significantly, the news informed Fletcher his only nearby available extent fuel supply was gone.
As nightfall ended aircraft operations for the day, Admiral Fletcher ordered TF 17 to head west and prepared to launch a 360° search at first light. Admiral Crace also turned west to stay within striking range of the Louisiades. Admiral Inoue directed Takagi to make sure he destroyed the U.S. carriers the next day, and postponed the Port Moresby landings to 12 May. Takagi elected to take his carriers 120 nmi (220 km) north during the night so he could concentrate his morning search to the west and south and ensure that his carriers could provide better protection for the invasion convoy. Gotō and Kajioka were unable to position and coordinate their ships in time to attempt a night attack on the Allied warships. Yet another failure in coordination.
Imperial Japanese Dive Bombers en route to the target - US Carrier Battlegroups’ last reported position
Both sides expected to find each other early the next day, and spent the night preparing their strike aircraft for the anticipated battle as their exhausted aircrews attempted to get a few hours' sleep. In 1972, more than 30 years later, U.S. Vice-Admiral H. S. Duckworth, after reading Japanese records of the battle, commented, "Without a doubt, May 7, 1942, vicinity of Coral Sea, was the most confused battle area in world history." Hara later told Yamamoto's chief of staff, Admiral Matome Ugaki, he was so frustrated with the "poor luck" the Japanese experienced on the 7th of May that he felt like quitting the navy.
The second day saw better results for both sides. At 06:15 on the 8th of May, from a position 100 nmi (120 mi; 190 km) east of Rossel Island, Admiral Hara launched seven torpedo bombers to search the area bearing 140–230°, out to 250 nmi (460 km) from the Japanese carriers. Assisting in the search were three Kawanishi H6Ks from Tulagi and four G4M bombers from Rabaul. At 07:00, the carrier striking force turned to the southwest and was joined by two of Gotō's cruisers, Kinugasa and Furutaka, for additional screening support. The invasion convoy, Admirals Gotō and Kajioka steered towards a rendezvous point 40 nmi (74 km) east of Woodlark Island to await the outcome of the carrier battle. During the night, the warm frontal zone with low clouds which had helped hide the U.S. carriers on May 7th moved north and east and now covered the Japanese carriers, limiting visibility to between 2 and 15 nmi (3.7 and 27.8 km).
At 08:20, a Lexington SBD piloted by Joseph G. Smith spotted the Japanese carriers through a hole in the clouds and notified TF 17. Two minutes later, a Shōkaku search plane commanded by Lieutenant Kenzō Kanno sighted TF 17 and notified Admiral Hara. The two forces were about 210 nmi (390 km) apart. Both sides raced to launch their strike aircraft.
At 09:15, the Japanese carriers launched a combined strike of 18 fighters, 33 dive bombers, and 18 torpedo planes, commanded by Takahashi, with Shimazaki again leading the torpedo bombers. The U.S. carriers each launched a separate strike. Yorktown's group consisted of six fighters, 24 dive bombers, and nine torpedo planes and was on its way by 09:15. Lexington's group of nine fighters, 15 dive bombers, and 12 torpedo planes was off at 09:25. Both the U.S. and Japanese carrier warship forces turned to head directly for each other's location at high speed in order to shorten the distance their aircraft would have to fly on their return legs.
USS Yorktown from the flight deck of the Lexington, before battle. May 7, 1942.
Yorktown's dive bombers, led by Lieutenant-Commander William O. Burch, reached the Japanese carriers at 10:32, and paused to allow the slower torpedo squadron to arrive so that they could conduct a simultaneous attack. At this time, Shōkaku and Zuikaku were about 10,000 yd (9,100 m) apart, with Zuikaku hidden under a rain squall of low-hanging clouds. The two carriers were protected by 16 CAP Zero fighters. The Yorktown dive bombers commenced their attacks at 10:57 on Shōkaku and hit the radically maneuvering carrier with two 1,000 lb (450 kg) bombs, tearing open the forecastle and causing heavy damage to the carrier's flight and hangar decks. The Yorktown torpedo planes missed with all of their ordnance. Two U.S. SBD dive bombers and two CAP Zeros were shot down during the attack.
Lexington's aircraft arrived and attacked at 11:30. Two dive bombers attacked Shōkaku, hitting the carrier with one 1,000 lb (450 kg) bomb, causing further damage. Two other dive bombers dove on Zuikaku, missing with their bombs. The rest of Lexington's dive bombers were unable to find the Japanese carriers in the heavy clouds. Lexington's TBDs missed Shōkaku with all 11 of their torpedoes, though this was not surprising with poor American guidance systems at the time. The 13 CAP Zeros on patrol at this time shot down three Wildcat fighters
With her flight deck heavily damaged and 223 of her crew killed or wounded, having also suffered explosions in her gasoline storage tanks and an engine repair workshop destroyed, Shōkaku was unable to conduct further aircraft operations. Her captain, Takatsugu Jōjima, requested permission from Takagi and Hara to withdraw from the battle, to which Takagi agreed. At 12:10, Shōkaku, accompanied by two destroyers, retired to the northeast. One japanese fleet carrier was out of the fight. But the enemy wasn't down and out yet.
JAPAN'S COUNTERSTRIKE
At 10:55, Lexington's comparatively modern CXAM-1 radar detected the inbound Japanese aircraft at a range of 68 nmi (126 km) and vectored nine Wildcats to intercept. Expecting the Japanese torpedo bombers to be at a much lower altitude than they actually were, six of the Wildcats were stationed too low, and thus missed the Japanese aircraft as they passed by overhead. Because of the heavy losses in aircraft suffered the night before, the Japanese could not execute a full torpedo attack on both carriers. Lieutenant Commander Shigekazu Shimazaki, commanding the Japanese torpedo planes, sent 14 to attack Lexington and four to attack Yorktown. A Wildcat shot down one and patrolling SBDs (eight from Yorktown, 15 from Lexington) destroyed three more as the Japanese torpedo planes descended to take attack position. In return, escorting Zeros shot down four Yorktown SBD dive bombers.
The Japanese attack began at 11:13 as the carriers, stationed 3,000 yd (2,700 m) apart, and their escorts opened fire with anti-aircraft guns. The four torpedo planes which attacked Yorktown all missed. The remaining torpedo planes successfully employed a pincer attack on Lexington, which had a much larger turning radius than Yorktown, and, at 11:20, hit her with two Type 91 torpedoes. The first torpedo buckled the port aviation gasoline stowage tanks.
Undetected, gasoline vapors spread into surrounding compartments. The second torpedo ruptured the port water main, reducing water pressure to the three forward firerooms and forcing the associated boilers to be shut down. The ship could still make 24 kn (44 km/h) with her remaining boilers. Four of the Japanese torpedo planes were shot down by Lexington’s anti-aircraft fire.
The 33 Japanese dive bombers circled to attack from upwind, and thus did not begin their dives from 14,000 ft (4,300 m) until three to four minutes after the torpedo planes began their attacks. The 19 Shōkaku dive bombers, under Takahashi, lined up on Lexington while the remaining 14, directed by Tamotsu Ema, targeted Yorktown. Escorting Zeros shielded Takahashi's aircraft from four Lexington CAP Wildcats which attempted to intervene, but two Wildcats circling above Yorktown were able to disrupt Ema's formation.
Takahashi's bombers damaged Lexington with two bomb hits and several near misses, causing fires which were contained by 12:33. At 11:27, Yorktown was hit in the centre of her flight deck by a single 250 kg (550 lb), semi-armour-piercing bomb which penetrated four decks before exploding, causing severe structural damage to an aviation storage room and killing or seriously wounding 66 men, as well as damaging the superheater boilers which rendered them inoperable. Up to 12 near-misses damaged Yorktown's hull below the waterline. Two of the dive bombers were shot down by a CAP F4F Wildcat during the attack.
As the Japanese aircraft completed their attacks and began to withdraw, mistakenly believing that they inflicted fatal damage to both carriers, they ran a gauntlet of CAP Wildcats and SBDs. In the ensuing aerial duels, three SBDs and three Wildcats for the U.S., and three torpedo bombers, one dive bomber, and one Zero for the Japanese were downed. By 12:00, the U.S. and Japanese strike groups were on their way back to their respective carriers. During their return, aircraft from the two adversaries passed each other in the air, resulting in more air-to-air altercations. Kanno's and Takahashi's aircraft were shot down, killing both of the strike leaders.
RECOVERY AND RETREAT
The strike forces, with many damaged aircraft, reached and landed on their respective carriers between 12:50 and 14:30. In spite of damage, Yorktown and Lexington were able to recover aircraft from their returning air groups. During recovery operations, for various reasons the U.S. lost an additional five SBDs, two TBDs, and a Wildcat. The Japanese lost two Zeros, five dive bombers, and one torpedo plane to non-combat action. Forty-six of the original 69 aircraft from the Japanese strike force returned from the mission and landed on Zuikaku.
Of these returning planes, three more Zeros, four dive bombers and five torpedo planes were judged damaged beyond repair and were immediately jettisoned into the sea.
Tamotsu Ema, leader of the Zuikaku dive bombers that damaged Yorktown
Shown here relaxing aboard Zuikaku before a mission.
As TF 17 recovered its aircraft, Fletcher assessed the situation. The returning aviators reported they heavily damaged one carrier, but that another had escaped damage. Fletcher noted that both his carriers were hurt and that his air groups had suffered high fighter losses. Fuel was also a concern due to the loss of the Neosho. At 14:22, Fitch notified Fletcher that he had reports of two undamaged Japanese carriers and that this was supported by radio intercepts. Believing that he faced overwhelming Japanese carrier superiority, Fletcher elected to withdraw TF 17 from the battle. Fletcher radioed General MacArthur the approximate position of the Japanese carriers and suggested that he attack with his land-based bombers, notably B-17s.
Around 14:30 in the afternoon, Admiral Hara informed Admiral Takagi that only 24 Zeros, eight dive bombers, and four torpedo planes from the carriers were currently operational. Takagi was worried about his ships' fuel levels; his cruisers were at 50% and some of his destroyers were as low as 20%. At 15:00, Takagi notified Inoue his fliers had sunk two U.S. carriers – Yorktown and a "Saratoga-class" – but heavy losses in aircraft meant he could not continue to provide air cover for the invasion. Inoue, whose reconnaissance aircraft sighted Crace's ships earlier that day, recalled the invasion convoy to Rabaul, postponed MO to July 3rd, and ordered his forces to assemble northeast of the Solomons to begin the RY operation. Zuikaku and her escorts turned towards Rabaul while Shōkaku headed for Japan and drydock.
Aboard Lexington, damage control parties put out the fires and restored her to operational condition, but at 12:47, sparks from unattended electric motors ignited gasoline fumes near the ship's central control station. The resulting explosion killed 25 men and started a large fire. Around 14:42 PM, another large explosion occurred, starting a second severe fire. A third explosion occurred at 15:25 and at 15:38 the ship's crew reported the fires as uncontrollable. Lexington's crew began abandoning ship at 17:07. After the carrier's survivors were rescued, including Admiral Fitch and the ship's skipper, Captain Frederick C. Sherman, at 19:15 the destroyer USS Phelps fired five torpedoes into the burning ship, which sank in 2,400 fathoms at 19:52 (7:52 PM). Two hundred and sixteen of the carrier's 2,951-man crew went down with the ship, along with 36 aircraft. Phelps and the other assisting warships left immediately to rejoin Yorktown and her escorts, which departed earlier at 16:01 in the afternoon, and TF 17 retired to the southwest. Later that evening, General MacArthur informed Fletcher that eight of his B-17s had attacked the invasion convoy and that it was retiring to the northwest.
That evening, Admiral Crace detached HMAS Hobart, which was critically low on fuel, and the destroyer HMAS Walke, which was having engine trouble, to proceed to nearby Townsville. Crace overheard radio reports saying the enemy invasion convoy had turned back, but, unaware Fletcher had withdrawn, he remained on patrol with the rest of TG 17.3 in the Coral Sea in case the Japanese invasion force resumed its advance towards Port Moresby. Unknowingly brave.
AFTERMATH
On the 9th of May, TF 17 altered course to the east and proceeded out of the Coral Sea via a route south of New Caledonia. Fleet Admiral Nimitz ordered Admiral Fletcher to return Yorktown to Pearl Harbor as soon as possible after refueling at Tongatabu. During the day, U.S. Army bombers attacked Deboyne and Kamikawa Maru, inflicting unknown damage. In the meantime, having heard nothing from his American counterpart, Admiral Fletcher, Crace deduced that TF17 had departed the area. At 01:00 on 10 May, hearing no further reports of Japanese ships advancing towards Port Moresby, Admiral Crace turned towards Australia and arrived at Cid Harbor, 130 nmi (240 km) south of Townsville, on May 11th.
At 22:00 on 8 May, Admiral Yamamoto ordered Inoue to turn his forces around, destroy the remaining Allied warships, and complete the invasion of Port Moresby. Inoue did not cancel the recall of the invasion convoy, but instead ordered Admirals Takagi and Gotō to pursue the remaining Allied warship forces in the Coral Sea. Critically low on fuel, Takagi's warships spent most of 9 May refueling from the fleet oiler Tōhō Maru which gave Fletcher’s taskforce time to escape. Late in the evening of 9 May, Takagi and Gotō headed southeast, then southwest into the Coral Sea. Seaplanes from Deboyne assisted Takagi in searching for TF 17 on the morning of 10 May. Fletcher and Crace were already well on their way out of the area. At 13:00 on 10 May, Takagi concluded that the enemy was gone and decided to turn back towards Rabaul. Yamamoto concurred with Takagi's decision and ordered Zuikaku to return to Japan to replenish her air groups. At the same time, Kamikawa Maru packed up and departed Deboyne. At noon on 11 May, a U.S. Navy PBY on patrol from Nouméa sighted the drifting hulk of the oiler Neosho. The U.S. destroyer USS Henley responded and rescued 109 Neosho and 14 Sims survivors later that day, then scuttled the tanker with gunfire.
On 10 May, Operation RY commenced. After the operation's flagship, minelayer Okinoshima, was sunk by the U.S. submarine S-42 on 12 May (05°06′S 153°48′E), the landings were postponed until 17 May. In the meantime, Halsey's TF 16 reached the South Pacific near Efate and, on 13 May, headed north to contest the Japanese approach to Nauru and Ocean Island. On 14 May, Nimitz, having obtained intelligence concerning the Combined Fleet's upcoming operation against Midway, ordered Halsey to make sure that Japanese scout aircraft sighted his ships the next day, after which he was to return to Pearl Harbor immediately. At 10:15 on 15 May, a Kawanishi reconnaissance aircraft from Tulagi sighted TF 16 445 nmi (512 mi; 824 km) east of the Solomons. Halsey's feint worked. Fearing a carrier air attack on his exposed invasion forces, Inoue immediately canceled RY and ordered his ships back to Rabaul and Truk. On 19 May, TF 16 – which returned to the Efate area to refuel – turned towards Pearl Harbor and arrived there on 26 May. Yorktown reached Pearl the following day.
Shōkaku reached Kure, Japan, on 17 May, almost capsizing en route during a storm due to her battle damage. Zuikaku arrived at Kure on 21 May, having made a brief stop at Truk on 15 May. Acting on signals intelligence, the U.S. placed eight submarines along the projected route of the carriers' return paths to Japan, but the submarines were not able to make any attacks. Japan's Naval General Staff estimated that it would take two to three months to repair Shōkaku and replenish the carriers' air groups. Thus, both carriers would be unable to participate in Yamamoto's upcoming Midway operation. The two carriers rejoined the Combined Fleet on 14 July and were key participants in subsequent carrier battles against U.S. forces. The five I-class submarines supporting the MO operation were retasked to support an attack on Sydney Harbour three weeks later as part of a campaign to disrupt Allied supply lines. En route to Truk, the submarine I-28 was torpedoed on 17 May by the U.S. submarine USS Tautog and sank with all hands.
Bomb damage to IJN Shōkaku's bow and forward flight deck
From American attack, she would be laid up in drydock for several months, keeping her out of pinnacle battles, including Midway.
STRATEGIC RETREAT
The remaining US forces, with one fleet carrier (Lexington) lost, retreated with a damaged Yorktown to Pearl Harbor to prepare for the attack on Midway atoll three weeks later. The defining turning point in the Pacific War, Midway would likely not have been an American victory if Zuikaku and Shōkaku were present as part of the Kido Butai - First Carrier Striking Force, consisting of the fleet carriers Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu, and Soryu.
