Blog 64: In Memoriam: Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941 Remembered
Ensign of the Imperial Navy of Japan, “The Rising Sun”
Hi all and Welcome back to Brooke In The Air, this week, given how close to the date we are, we are going to pay tribute to the assault (or more accurately, the sneak attack) on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii in December of 1941. The attack, though devastating, led to the United States entering the war (World War II) on the side of the Allies.
The strike was led by Fleet Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto who actively campaigned for months not to attack the United States an ls was arguably a proponent of peace. Admiral Yamamoto even told the Emperor, Hirohito, when asked if war were declared on the United States, how long he could prosecute the war, “I can keep the United States at bay for six months. After that, I can make no promises.” The Japanese military leadership referred to the attack as the Hawaii Operation and Operation AI, and as Operation Z during its planning.
GEOGRAPHY
Pearl Harbor as seen in 2014 from the International Space Station
Photo Courtesy NASA
Pearl Harbor is and has been a shallow fresh-water American lagoon-harbor on/in the island of Oahu, Hawaii, west of Honolulu. It is a natural basin, not more than 40 feet deep and surrounded by Hawaii’s natural beauty plus the city of Honolulu and now, Hickam Air Force Base (Hickam AFB, now part of Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam).
THE ATTACK & PLANNING
The attack commenced at 7:48 a.m. December 8th. Hawaiian standard time. The base was attacked by 353 Imperial Japanese aircraft (including fighters, level and dive bombers, and torpedo bombers) in two waves, launched from six aircraft carriers.
Preliminary planning for an attack on Pearl Harbor to protect the move into the "Southern Resource Area" (the Japanese term for the Dutch East Indies and Southeast Asia, generally) had begun very early in 1941 (and reluctantly) under the auspices of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, then commanding Japan's Combined Fleet. Yamamoto won assent to formal planning and training for an attack from the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff only after much contention with Naval Headquarters, including a threat to resign his command. Full-scale planning was underway by early spring 1941, primarily by Rear Admiral Ryūnosuke Kusaka, with assistance from Captain Minoru Genda and Yamamoto's Deputy Chief of Staff, Captain Kameto Kuroshima. The planners studied the 1940 British air attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto intensively.
Over the next several months, pilots were trained, equipment was adapted, and intelligence was collected. Despite these preparations, Emperor Hirohito did not approve the attack plan until November 5th, after the third of four Imperial Conferences called to consider the matter.
Final authorization for the strike was not given by the emperor until December 1st, after a majority of Japanese leaders advised him the "Hull Note" (America’s counter-proposal for peace with Japan under US Ambassador Cordell Hull) would "destroy the fruits of the China incident (Japan’s invasion of mainland China), endanger Manchukuo and undermine Japanese control of Korea.
By late 1941, many observers believed that hostilities between the US and Japan were imminent. While US Pacific bases and facilities had been placed on alert on many occasions, US officials seriously doubted Pearl Harbor would be the first target; instead, they expected the Philippines would be attacked first. This presumption was due to the threat that the air bases throughout the country and the naval base at Manila posed to sea lanes, as well as to the critical shipment of supplies to Japan from territory to the south. American intelligence also incorrectly and erroneously believed that Japan was not capable of mounting more than one major naval operation at a time.
Carrier IJN Kaga and her escorts of the Kido Butai in Hittokapu Bay, prior to departuree for Pearl Harbor, November, 1941
On November 26th, 1941, a Japanese task force (the Kido Butai, or First Carrier Striking Force) of six aircraft carriers – Akagi, Kaga, Sōryū, Hiryū, Shōkaku, and Zuikaku – departed Hittokapu Bay on Etorofu (now known as Iterup) Island in the Kuril Islands in northern Japan, en route to a position northwest of Hawaii, intending to launch its 408 aircraft to attack Pearl Harbor: 360 for the two attack waves and 48 on defensive combat air patrol (CAP), including nine fighters from the first wave.
The aircrews were ordered to select the highest value targets (battleships and aircraft carriers) or, if these were not present, any other high-value ships (notably, cruisers and destroyers). First-wave dive bombers were to attack ground targets. Fighters were ordered to strafe and destroy as many parked aircraft as possible to ensure they did not get into the air to intercept the bombers, especially in the first wave. When the fighters' fuel got low they were to refuel at the aircraft carriers and return to combat. Fighters were to serve CAP duties where needed, especially over US airfields.
SCOUTING
Before the attack commenced, the Imperial Japanese Navy launched reconnaissance floatplanes from heavy cruisers Chikuma and Tone, one to scout over Oahu and the other over Lahaina Roads, Maui, respectively, with orders to report on US fleet composition and location.
~ Overview of the participating Heavy Cruisers as scouting leads
Tone (or 利根, pronounced “Ton-Eh”) was the lead ship in the two-vessel Tone class of heavy cruisers in the Imperial Japanese Navy. The ship was named after the Tone River, in the Kantō region of Japan and was completed on November 20th, 1938 at Mitsubishi's Nagasaki shipyards. Tone was designed for long-range scouting missions and had a large seaplane capacity. She was extensively employed during World War II usually providing scouting services to their aircraft carrier task forces. She almost always operated in this capacity in conjunction with her sister ship Chikuma.
Chikuma (筑摩) was the second and last vessel in the Tone class of heavy cruisers in the Imperial Japanese Navy. The ship was named after the Chikuma River in Nagano Prefecture. Entering service in 1939, Chikuma saw battle during World War II in the Pacific, hunting small allied ships in the Indian Ocean and serving in many escorting missions throughout many large-scale aircraft carrier battles between Japan and the United States. On the 25 of October 1944, she served in the Battle off Samar where she possibly sank the escort carrier USS Gambier Bay (though most modern sources attribute the carrier's sinking to Battleship IJN Yamato) and damaged the destroyer USS Heermann, before being crippled by gunfire from the destroyer escort USS Samuel B. Roberts and sunk by air attacks.
See cruiser details below.-
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IJN Tone off Hiroshima Bay, 1940, notice the scout floatplanes in the aft/stern
Name: IJN Tone
Namesake: Tone River
Builder: Mitsubishi
Laid down: December 1st, 1934
Launched: November 21st 1937
Sunk: July 24th, 1945 by USN aircraft at Kure, Hiroshima
General characteristics
Class and type: Tone-class heavy cruiser
Displacement: 11,213 tons (standard); 15,443 (final) Length 189.1 m (620 ft 5 in) Beam19.4 m (63 ft 8 in)
Propulsion ~ as listed
Gihon geared turbines
8 oil-fired boilers
152,000 shp (113,000 kW)
4 shafts
Speed: 35-knot (65 km/h)Range8,000 nmi (15,000 km) at 18 knots (33 km/h)
Complement: 874 officers and men
Armament
8 × 20cm/50 caliber Type 3s (4x2)
8 × 127 mm (5 in)/40 guns
12 × Type 96 25 mm (0.98 in) AA guns (6x2)
12 × 610 mm (24 in) torpedo tubes (4x3)
Armor:
100 mm (3.9 in) (belt)
65–30 mm (2.6–1.2 in) (deck)
Aircraft carried: 6 x Aichi E13A floatplanes - Used as Scouts
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IJN Chikuma, firing her guns in battle before her sinking off Samar
Name: IJN Chikuma
Namesake: Chikuma River
Builder: Mitsubishi
Laid down: October 1st, 1935
Launched: March 19th, 1938
Commissioned: May 20th 1939
Sank: October 25th, 1944 after Battle off Samar
General characteristics
Class: Tone-class Heavy cruiser
Displacement: 11,213 tons (standard); 15,443 (final).
Length: 189.1 m (620 ft 5 in) - Beam 19.4 m (63 ft 8 in) - Draught 6.2 m (20 ft 4 in)
Propulsion
4-shaft Gihon oil geared turbines
8 boilers
152,000 shp (113,000 kW)
Speed
35 knots (65 km/h) Range: 8,000 nmi (15,000 km) at 18 knots (33 km/h)
Complement: 874 officers and men
Armament
8 × 20 cm/50 3rd Year Type naval guns (4x2)
8 × 127 mm (5 in)/40 guns
6 × Type 96 25 mm (0.98 in) AA guns
12 × 610 mm (24-inch) torpedo tubes
Armor
100 mm (3.9 in) (belt)
65–30 mm (2.6–1.2 in) (deck)
Aircraft carried: 6 x Aichi E13A floatplanes used as Scouts
SCOUTING CONTINUED
U.S. Navy fleet composition and preparedness information in Pearl Harbor were already known due to the reports of the Japanese spy Takeo Yoshikawa. A report of the absence of the U.S. fleet in Lahaina anchorage off Maui was received from the Tone's floatplane and fleet submarine I-72. Another four scout planes patrolled the area between the Japanese carrier force (the Kido Butai), and Hawaiian Island of Niihau, to detect and respond to any counterattack.
AMERICAN AND JAPANESE DAMAGE AND LOSSES
Mitsubishi A6M2 Zero on the deck of the carrier Akagi
Of the eight U.S. Navy battleships present, all were damaged, with four sunk in the shallow harbor. All but the USS Arizona were later raised, and six were returned to service and went on to fight in the war. The Japanese also sank or damaged three cruisers, three destroyers, an anti-aircraft training ship, and at least one minelayer.
More than 180 US aircraft were destroyed. A total of 2,403 Americans were killed and 1,178 others were wounded, making it the deadliest event ever recorded in Hawaii. Important base installations such as the power station, dry dock, shipyard, maintenance, and fuel and torpedo storage facilities, as well as the submarine piers and headquarters building (also home of the US Navy’s intelligence section) were not attacked.
Comparatively, Japanese losses were very light: 29 aircraft and five midget submarines lost, in addition to 64 naval servicemen killed.
WORLD WAR II JOINED IN FULL
Japan announced declarations of war on the United States and the British Empire later that day (December 8 in Tokyo), but the declarations were not delivered until the following day. The British government declared war on Japan immediately after learning that their territory had also been attacked, while the following day (December 8) the United States Congress declared war on Japan. On December 11, though they had no formal obligation to do so under the Tripartite Pact with Japan, Germany and Italy each declared war on the U.S., which responded with a declaration of war against Germany and Italy. World War II was, now, fully joined.
INTENT OF ATTACK AND AIMS
The Japanese intended the attack as a preventive action to keep the United States Pacific Fleet from interfering with its planned military actions in Southeast Asia against overseas territories of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and the United States. Over the course of seven hours there were coordinated Japanese attacks on the US-held Philippines, Guam, and Wake Island and on the British Empire in Malaya, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Additionally, from the Japanese viewpoint, it was seen as a preemptive strike before their nation ran dry of oil.
BACKGROUND AND GUTS OF ATTACK
Kido Butai’s carrier striking force strategy map for the Pearl Harbor Attack.
The Japanese attack had several major aims of their strike. First, it intended to destroy important American fleet units, thereby preventing the Pacific Fleet from interfering with the Japanese conquest of the Dutch East Indies and Malaya and enabling Japan to conquer Southeast Asia without interference. Second, it was hoped to buy time for Japan to consolidate its position and increase its naval strength before shipbuilding authorized by the 1940 Vinson-Walsh Act erased any chance of victory. Third, to deliver a blow to America's ability to mobilize its forces in the Pacific, battleships were chosen as the main targets, since they were the prestige ships of any navy at the time. Finally, it was hoped that the attack would undermine American morale such that the U.S. government would drop its demands contrary to Japanese interests and would seek a compromise peace with Japan.
Striking the Pacific Fleet at anchor in Pearl Harbor carried two distinct disadvantages: the targeted ships would be in very shallow water, so it would be relatively easy to salvage and possibly repair them, and most of the crews would survive the attack since many would be on shore leave or would be rescued from the harbor. A further important disadvantage was the absence from Pearl Harbor of all three of the U.S. Pacific Fleet's aircraft carriers (USS Enterprise, USS Lexington, and USS Saratoga). Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) top command was attached to Admiral Mahan's "decisive battle" doctrine, especially that of destroying the maximum number of battleships. Despite these concerns, Admiral Yamamoto decided to press ahead with the plan to attack.
Japanese confidence in their ability to win a short war also meant other key targets in the American harbor, especially the navy yard, oil tank farms, and submarine base, were outright ignored since by their thinking the war would be over before the influence of these facilities would be felt or needed. Ideologically, Japanese military (and populace) leadership also had nothing but contempt for Americans, believing they were natural cowards, they did not wan t to fight, and the Americans were lethargic, resting in their lap of luxury, and the Japanese saw only themselves as true warriors.
The first wave of attacking aircraft was to be the primary attack, while the second wave was to attack carriers as its first objective and cruisers as its second, with battleships as the third target. The first wave carried most of the weapons to attack capital ships, mainly specially adapted Type 91 aerial torpedoes which were designed with an anti-roll mechanism and a rudder extension that let them operate in Pearl Harbor’s shallow water, commonly known as the Long Lance torpedo.
COMPOSITION - THE WAVES
The first attack wave of 183 planes was launched north of Oahu, led by esteemed Commander Mitsuo Fuchida. Six planes failed to launch due to technical difficulties. The first attack included three groups of planes:
1st Group - (targets: battleships and aircraft carriers)
- 49 Nakajima B5N Kate bombers armed with 800‑kg (1760 lb) armor-piercing bombs, organized in four sections (one failed to launch)
- 40 B5N bombers armed with Type 91 “Long Lance” torpedoes, also in four sections
2nd Group – (targets: Ford Island and Wheeler Field)
51 Aichi D3A Val dive bombers armed with 550 lb (249 kg) general-purpose bombs (3 aircraft failed to launch)
3rd Group – (targets: aircraft at Ford Island, Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, Barber's Point, Kaneohe)
43 Mitsubishi A6M "Zero" fighters for air control and strafing (2 aircraft failed to launch)
As the first wave approached Oahu, it was detected by the U.S. Army radar scanner at Opana Point near the island's northern tip. This post had been in training mode for months, but was not yet operational. The operators, Privates George Elliot Jr. & Joseph Lockard, reported a target to a private stationed at Fort Shafter's Army Intelligence Intercept Center near Pearl Harbor. But Lieutenant K. A. Tyler, a newly assigned officer at the thinly manned Intercept Center, presumed it was the scheduled arrival of at least six B-17 bombers from California. The Japanese planes were approaching from a direction very close (only a few degrees difference) to the bombers, and while the operators had never seen a formation as large on radar, they neglected to tell Tyler of its size.
On Imperial Japanese Navy’s approach, their aircraft encountered and shot down several opposing U.S. aircraft. At least one of these radioed a somewhat incoherent warning, likely garbled in combat. Other warnings from ships off the harbor entrance were still being processed or awaiting confirmation when the Japanese air assault began at 7:48 a.m. Hawaiian time (3:18 a.m. December 8th, 1941, Japanese Standard Time, with the attack on Kaneohe. A total of 353 Japanese planes reached Oahu in two waves. Slow, vulnerable torpedo bombers led the first wave, exploiting the first moments of surprise to attack the most important ships present (the battleships), while dive bombers attacked U.S. air bases across Oahu, starting with Hickam Field, the largest, and Wheeler Field, the main U.S. Army Air Forces fighter base.
The 171 planes in the second wave attacked the Army Air Forces' Bellows Field near Kaneohe on the windward side of the island, and Ford Island. The only aerial opposition came from a handful of P-36 Hawks, P-40 Warhawks, and some SBD Dauntless dive bombers on patrol from the only American carrier nearby, the USS Enterprise, the “Big E.”
In the first-wave attack, about eight of the forty-nine 800‑kg (1760 lb) armor-piercing bombs dropped hit their intended battleship targets. At least two of those bombs broke up on impact, another detonated before penetrating an unarmored deck, and one was a dud. Thirteen of the forty torpedoes hit battleships, and four torpedoes hit other ships. Men aboard US ships awoke to the sounds of alarms, bombs exploding, and gunfire, prompting bleary-eyed men to dress as they ran to General Quarters stations. (The famous message, "Air raid Pearl Harbor. This is not drill.", was sent from the headquarters of Patrol Wing Two, the first senior Hawaiian command unit to respond.) American servicemen were caught unprepared by the attack. Ammunition lockers were locked, aircraft parked wingtip to wingtip in the open to prevent sabotage - a concern rooted in racism. Guns were largely unmanned (none of the Navy's 5"/38s, only a quarter of its machine guns, and only four of 31 Army batteries got in action). Despite this low alert status, many American military personnel responded effectively during the attack. Ensign Joseph Taussig Jr., aboard USS Nevada, commanded the ship's antiaircraft guns and was severely wounded but continued to be active on post, refusing to be moved by medics. Lieutenant Commander F. J. Thomas commanded Nevada in the captain's absence and got her underway until the ship was grounded at 9:10 a.m.
As the first wave of planes approached Oahu, they encountered and shot down several U.S. aircraft. At least one of these radioed a somewhat incoherent warning. Other warnings from ships off the harbor entrance were still being processed or awaiting confirmation when the Japanese air assault began at 7:48 a.m. Hawaiian time (3:18 a.m. December 8 Japanese Standard Time, as kept by ships of the Kido Butai), with the attack on Kaneohe. A total of 353 Japanese planes reached Oahu in two waves.
Slow, vulnerable torpedo bombers led the first wave, exploiting the first moments of surprise to attack the most important ships present (the battleships), while dive bombers attacked U.S. air bases across Oahu, starting with Hickam Field, the largest, and Wheeler Field, the main U.S. Army Air Forces fighter base. The 171 planes in the second wave attacked the Army Air Forces' Bellows Field near Kaneohe on the windward side of the island and Ford Island. The only aerial opposition came from a handful of P-36 Hawks, P-40 Warhawks, and some SBD Dauntless dive bombers from the carrier Enterprise.
USS West Virginia sinking during the attack
Lt. George Welch, fighter ace and one of few pilots who managed to get airborne
Second wave composition
The second planned wave consisted of 171 planes: 54 B5Ns, 81 D3As, and 36 A6Ms, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Shigekazu Shimazaki. Four planes failed to launch because of technical difficulties. This wave and its targets also comprised three groups of planes:
1st Group – 54 B5Ns armed with 550 lb (249 kg) and 132 lb (60 kg) general-purpose bombs
27 B5Ns – aircraft and hangars on Kaneohe, Ford Island, and Barbers Point
27 B5Ns – hangars and aircraft on Hickam Field
2nd Group (targets: aircraft carriers and cruisers)
78 D3As armed with 550 lb (249 kg) general-purpose bombs, in four sections (3 aborted)
3rd Group – (targets: aircraft at Ford Island, Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, Barber's Point, Kaneohe)
35 A6M Zeros for defense and strafing (1 aborted)
The second wave was divided into three groups. One was tasked to attack Kāneʻohe, the rest Pearl Harbor proper. The separate sections arrived at the attack point almost simultaneously from several directions.
Ninety minutes (90) after it began, the attack was over. 2,008 sailors were killed and 710 others wounded; 218 soldiers and airmen (who were part of the Army prior to the independent United States Air Force in 1947) were killed and 364 wounded; 109 Marines were killed and 69 wounded; and 68 civilians were killed and 35 wounded. In total, 2,403 Americans were killed, and 1,178 were wounded. Eighteen ships were sunk or run aground, including five battleships. All of the Americans killed or wounded during the attack were legally non-combatants, given that there was no state of war when the attack occurred.
The attack as photographed from a First Wave IJN plane.
Of all the American fatalities, nearly half were due to the explosion of Arizona's forward magazine after it was hit by a modified 16-inch (410 mm) shell. Author Craig Nelson wrote that the vast majority of the U.S. sailors killed at Pearl Harbor were junior enlisted personnel. "The officers of the Navy all lived in houses and the junior people were the ones on the boats, so pretty much all of the people who died in the direct line of the attack were very junior people", Nelson said. "So everyone is about 17 or 18 whose story is told there.”
Although the Japanese concentrated on battleships (the largest vessels present), they did not ignore other targets. The light cruiser Helena was torpedoed, and the concussion from the blast capsized the neighboring minelayer Oglala. Two destroyers in dry dock, Cassin and Downes, were destroyed when bombs penetrated their fuel bunkers. The leaking fuel caught fire; flooding the dry dock in an effort to fight fire made the burning oil rise, and both destroyers were burned out. Cassin slipped from her keel blocks and rolled against Downes. The light cruiser Raleigh was holed by a torpedo. The light cruiser Honolulu was damaged but remained in service. The repair vessel Vestal, moored alongside Arizona, was heavily damaged and beached. The seaplane tender Curtiss was also damaged. The destroyer Shaw was badly damaged when two bombs penetrated her forward magazine.
Possible Third Wave
According to some accounts, several Japanese junior officers, including Fuchida and Genda, urged Admiral Nagumo to carry out a third strike in order to sink more of the Pearl Harbor's remaining warships, and damage the base's maintenance shops, drydock facilities and oil tank yards. Most notably, Fuchida gave a firsthand account of this meeting several times after the war. However, some historians have cast doubt on this and many other of Fuchida's later claims, which sometimes conflict with documented historic records. Genda, who opined during the planning for the attack that without an invasion three strikes were necessary to fully disable the Pacific Fleet, denied requesting an additional attack. Regardless, it is undisputed that the captains of the other five carriers in the task force reported they were willing and ready to carry out a third strike soon after the second returned, but regardless Admiral Nagumo decided to withdraw for several reasons:
American anti-aircraft performance had improved considerably during the second strike, and two-thirds of Japan's losses were incurred during the second wave.
Nagumo felt if he launched a third strike, he would be risking three-quarters of the Combined Fleet's strength to wipe out the remaining targets (which included the facilities) while suffering higher aircraft losses.
The location of the American carriers remained unknown. In addition, the admiral was concerned his force was now within range of American land-based bombers. Nagumo was uncertain whether the United States had enough surviving planes remaining on Hawaii to launch an attack against his carriers.
A third wave would have required substantial preparation and turnaround time, and would have meant returning planes would have had to land at night. At the time, only the British Royal Navy had developed night carrier techniques, so this was a substantial risk. The first two waves had launched the entirety of the Combined Fleet's air strength. A third wave would have required landing both the first and second wave before launching the first wave again. Compare Nagumo's situation in the Battle of Midway 6 months later, where an attack returning from Midway kept Nagumo from launching an immediate strike on American carriers.
The task force's fuel situation did not permit him to remain in waters north of Pearl Harbor much longer, since he was at the very limit of logistical support. To do so risked running unacceptably low on fuel, perhaps even having to abandon destroyers en route home.
He believed the second strike had essentially accomplished the mission's main objective (neutralizing the United States Pacific Fleet) and did not wish to risk further losses. Moreover, it was IJN practice to prefer the conservation of strength over the total destruction of the enemy.
Although a hypothetical third strike would have likely focused on the base's remaining warships, military historians have suggested any potential damage to the nearby shore facilities would have hampered the Pacific Fleet far more seriously. If they had been wiped out, "serious American operations in the Pacific would have been postponed for more than a year"; according to Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, later Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, "it would have prolonged the war another two years".
At a conference aboard his flagship the following morning, Fleet Admiral Yamamoto supported Rear Admiral Nagumo's withdrawal without launching a third wave. In retrospect, sparing the vital dockyards, maintenance shops, and the oil tank farm meant the United States could respond relatively quickly in the Pacific. Yamamoto later regretted Nagumo's decision to withdraw and categorically stated it had been a great mistake not to order a third strike.
The USS Arizona, after being struck.
LOSSES
In total losses tallied the following:
4 battleships sunk
4 battleships damaged
1 ex-battleship sunk
1 harbor tug sunk
3 light cruisers damaged
3 destroyers damaged
3 other ships damaged
188 aircraft destroyed
159 aircraft damaged
2,008 sailors killed
109 Marines killed
208 soldiers killed
68 civilians killed
2,403 total killed
1,178 military and civilians wounded
DETAILED LOSSES
In total, twenty-one American ships were damaged or lost in the attack, of which all but three were repaired and returned to service.
BATTLESHIPS
Arizona (Rear Admiral Isaac C. Kidd's flagship of Battleship Division One): hit by four armor-piercing bombs, exploded; total loss, not salvaged. 1,177 dead.
Oklahoma: hit by five torpedoes, capsized; total loss, salvaged, sank en route to scrapping May 1947. 429 dead.
West Virginia: hit by two bombs, seven torpedoes, sunk; returned to service July 1944. 106 dead.
California: hit by two bombs, two torpedoes, sunk; returned to service January 1944. 104 dead.[139]
Nevada: hit by six bombs, one torpedo, beached; returned to service October 1942. 60 dead.
Pennsylvania (Admiral Husband E. Kimmel's flagship of the United States Pacific Fleet): in dry dock with Cassin and Downes, hit by one bomb and debris from USS Cassin; remained in service. 9 dead.
Tennessee: hit by two bombs; returned to service February 1942. 5 dead.
Maryland: hit by two bombs; returned to service February 1942. 4 dead (including one floatplane pilot shot down).
CRUISERS
Helena: hit by one torpedo; returned to service January 1942. 20 dead.
Raleigh: hit by one torpedo; returned to service February 1942.
Honolulu: near miss, light damage; remained in service.
DESTROYERS
Cassin: in drydock with Downes and Pennsylvania, hit by one bomb, burned; reconstructed and returned to service February 1944.
Downes: in drydock with Cassin and Pennsylvania, caught fire from Cassin, burned; reconstructed and returned to service November 1943.
Helm: underway to West Loch, damaged by two near-miss bombs; continued patrol; dry-docked January 15, 1942, and sailed January 20, 1942.
Shaw: hit by three bombs; returned to service June 1942.
AUXILIARIES
Oglala (minelayer): damaged by torpedo hit on Helena, capsized; returned to service (as engine-repair ship) February 1944.
Vestal (repair ship): hit by two bombs, blast and fire from Arizona, beached; returned to service by August 1942.
Curtiss (seaplane tender): hit by one bomb, one crashed Japanese aircraft; returned to service January 1942. 19 dead.
Sotoyomo (harbor tug): damaged by explosion and fires in Shaw; sunk; returned to service August 1942.
YFD-2 (yard floating dock): damaged by bombs; sunk; returned to service January 25, 1942, servicing Shaw.
The day after the attack, Roosevelt delivered his famous Day of Infamy speech to a Joint Session of Congress, calling for a formal declaration of war on the Empire of Japan. Congress obliged his request less than an hour later. On December 11, Germany and Italy declared war on the United States, even though the Tripartite Pact did not require Congress issued a declaration of war against Germany and Italy later that same day.
The United Kingdom had already been at war with Germany since September 1939 and with Italy since June 1940, and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill had promised to declare war "within the hour" of a Japanese attack on the United States. Upon learning of the Japanese attacks on Malaya, Singapore, and Hong Kong, Churchill promptly determined there was no need to either wait or further consult the US government and immediately summoned the Japanese Ambassador. As a result, the United Kingdom declared war on Japan nine hours before the United States did.
The attack was an initial shock to all the Allies in the Pacific Theater. Further losses compounded the alarming setback. Japan attacked the Philippines hours later (because of the time difference, it was December 8th in the Philippines). Only three days after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the battleship Prince of Wales and battlecruiser Repulse were sunk off the coast of Malaya, causing Churchill later to recollect "In all the war I never received a more direct shock. As I turned and twisted in bed the full horror of the news sank in upon me. There were no British or American capital ships in the Indian Ocean or the Pacific except the American survivors of Pearl Harbor who were hastening back to California. Over this vast expanse of waters, Japan was supreme and we everywhere were weak and naked." - Winston Churchill.
OUTCOME
While the attack accomplished its intended objective, it turned out to be largely unnecessary. Unbeknownst to Yamamoto, who conceived the original plan, the United States Navy had decided as far back as 1935 to abandon "charging" across the Pacific towards the Philippines in response to an outbreak of war. The United States instead adopted "Plan Dog" in 1940, which emphasized keeping the IJN out of the eastern Pacific and away from the shipping lanes to Australia, while the United States concentrated on defeating Nazi Germany. Plan Dog set out the main options and suggested fighting a defensive war in the Pacific while giving strategic priority to defeating Germany and Italy.
Fortunately for the United States, the American aircraft carriers were untouched; otherwise the Pacific Fleet's ability to conduct offensive operations would have been crippled for a year or more (given no diversions from the Atlantic Fleet). As it was, the Navy was left with no choice but to rely on carriers and submarines. While six of the eight battleships were repaired and returned to service, their relatively low speed and high fuel consumption limited their deployment, and they served mainly in shore bombardment roles (their only major action being the Battle of Surigao Strait in October 1944). A major flaw in Japanese strategic thinking was a belief that the ultimate Pacific battle would be fought by battleships, in keeping with the doctrine of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan. As a result, Yamamoto (and his successors) hoarded battleships for a "decisive battle" (Kantai Kessen) that never happened.
The Japanese confidence in their ability to win a quick victory meant that they neglected Pearl Harbor's navy repair yards, oil tank farms, submarine base and old headquarters building. All of these targets were omitted from Commander Genda's list, yet they proved more important than any one battleship to the American war effort in the Pacific. The survival of the repair shops and fuel depots allowed Pearl Harbor to maintain logistical support of the Navy, such as the Doolittle Raid and the Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway. It was submarines that immobilized the Imperial Japanese Navy's heavy ships and brought Japan's economy to a virtual standstill by crippling the importation of oil and raw materials: by the end of 1942, the amount of raw materials brought in was cut in half, "to a disastrous ten million tons", while oil "was almost completely stopped".
Lieutenant Fuchida would later claim he had designated Pearl Harbor's oil storage facilities as the primary target, although this contradicted Japanese military doctrine and even several interviews on the subject he had given earlier in life.
In less than eleven months, most of Japan's elite naval aviators who had been at Pearl Harbor were lost in subsequent battles. Lack of fuel and an inflexible training policy meant that they could not be replaced.
